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INTRODUCTION

In 1978 Congress enacted" and President Carter signed into
law2 the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 [FISA].3

The Act established the exclusive means by which foreign intelli1. S. 1566, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. IRc. 5994 (1978): (Apr. 20, considered and passed Senate); H.R. 1266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc.
9102 (1978): (Sept. 6, considered and passed House, amended); S. 1566, 95th
Cong. 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. 14798 (1978): (Sept. 12, Senate disagreed with
House amendments); S. 1566 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 17882 (1978):
(Oct. 9, Senate agreed to conference report); H.R. 5708, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124
CONG. REC. 17882: (Oct. 12, House agreed to conference report).
2. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES.
Doc. 1853 (Oct. 25, 1978).
3. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, § 101, 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801
(Supp. 1979).
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gence surveillance within the United States could be conducted.
It was a completion of the statutory schemata governing domestic
electronic eavesdropping created via Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control Act of 1968 [hereinafter Title III]. 4 Congress en-

acted the FISA to clarify and delineate the proper interface between the dictates of the fourth amendment and foreign intelligence eavesdropping within the country. 5 It was a legislative
response to a void in this area of the law.'
Since enactment, the post-Watergate atmosphere which
spawned impetus for FISA has given way to a mood more receptive to intelligence agencies and their activities. 7 Further, since
the statute provides for mandatory periodic Congressional scrutiny of its implementation and ramifications,8 it is important to
review and analyze this Act.
This note will explore the constitutional background of the executive practice of conducting warrantless electronic foreign intelligence surveillance, and the legislative history of the Act. It will
then examine the more important provisions of the statute, while
concurrently comparing these to comparable terms of Title III.
Constitutional issues or problems raised by the Act and its provisions will then be discussed. Finally, possible amendments to the
Act will be explored.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND

Originally, wiretapping escaped the fourth amendment 9 prohibition against "unreasonable searches and seizures" because normally such surveillance did not physically penetrate the constitutionally protected areas of either the house or the office. 10 This
4. Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968, Title III § 80Z, 18 U.S.C. § 2510

(1976).
5. H.R. REP. No. 1283-Pt. 1, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 20-22 (1978).
6. S. REP. No. 604-Pt. 1, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 3909, 3908.
7. NEWSWEEK, Jan. 28, 1980, at 31.

8. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1808(b) (Supp. 1979).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their
person, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

10. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). The Supreme Court also
reasoned that telephonic messages were intangibles, and as such the interception
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doctrine, delimiting the scope of a search,11 gave law enforcement
officials carte blanche to engage in warrantless electronic wiretapping.' Congress sought to bridle this discretion by enacting Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 [hereinafter
Section 605].'Section 605 ostensibly prohibited interception and dissemination of any communications received by nonconsensual wiretaps, 4
but it failed to specify the exclusionary rule as a remedy for violations perpetrated by government officials."5 The Supreme Court,
interpreting Section 605, held that the contents of communications seized in violation of the Act should be excluded from any
federal criminal trial,1' as should any evidence derived from a
7
prohibited wiretap.'

In 1940, President Roosevelt interpreted Section 605 and the
of those intangibles did not constitute a search for fourth amendment purposes.
Id. at 464.
11. W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.1(a) (1978). The trespassory intrusion into a constitutionally protected area doctrine was firmly delineated in
Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505 (1961); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1940); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 464-65 (1928).
12. B. SEVERN, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 107 (1973). The Court, in Olmstead v.
United States, did invite Congress to statutorily extend the exclusion remedy to
wiretap evidence to be used in federal criminal trials. 277 U.S. 438, 465-66
(1928).
13. Federal Communications Act of 1934, § 605, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976), as
amended by Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 803, 82 Stat. 223 (1968). The relevant provisions state that: "[N]o person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept
any [wire or radio] communications and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication
...and no person having received such intercepted communication or having
become acquainted with the contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of
the same or part thereof, knowing that such information was so obtained, shall
divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect or meaning
of the same or any part thereof, or use the same or any information therein
contained for his benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto."
14.

Id.

15. J. CARR, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 7 (1977).
16. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). The Supreme Court
failed to extend the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained by state authorities
in violation of Section 605, and used in state criminal trials. Schwartz v. Texas,
344 U.S. 199 (1952). This rule was expressly overturned by Lee v. Florida, 392
U.S. 378 (1967).
17. Nardon6 v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
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resultant Supreme Court cases"8 as not prohibiting nonconsensual
wiretaps for national defense purposes. 19 He authorized Attorney
General Jackson to initiate this type of surveillance, but to limit
investigations "insofar as possible to aliens." 20 Arguably, this directive did not address the propriety of trespassory buggings 21 for
national defense purposes.2 2 In 1946, Attorney General Clark's
18. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
19. Memorandum to Attorney General Jackson from President Roosevelt,
May 12, 1940, reprinted in Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 673-74 (D.C. Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
I have agreed with the broad purpose of the Supreme Court decision
relating to wire-tap in investigations. The court is undoubtably sound in
regard to the use of evidence secured over tapped wires in the prosecution
of citizens in criminal cases and is also right in its opinion that under ordinary and normal circumstances wire-tapping by Government agents
should not be carried on for the excellent reason that it is almost bound to
lead to abuse of civil rights.
However, I am convinced that the Supreme Court never intended any
dictum in the particular case which it decided to apply to grave matters
involving the defense of the nation.
It is, of course, well known that certain other nations have been engaged
in the organization of propaganda of so called "fifth columns" in other
countries and in preparations for sabotage, as well as in actual sabotage.
It is too late to do anything about it after sabotage, assassinations and
"fifth column" activities are completed.
You are, therefore, authorized and directed in such cases as you may
approve, after investigation of the need in each case, to authorize the necessary investigation agents that they are at liberty to secure information
direct[ed] to the conversation or other communications of persons suspected of subversive activities against the government of the United
States, including suspected spies. You are further requested to limit these
investigations so conducted to a minimum and to limit them insofar as
possible to aliens.
Two months earlier, Attorney General Robert H. Jackson announced a return to
the policy of forbidding wiretapping by federal agents as mandated by Section
605. Donner, Electronic Surveillance: The National Security Game, 2 Summer
1975 Civ. Lm. REV. 15, 18-20.
20. Id.
21. Bugging as distinguished from wiretapping is not limited to the interception of a specific telephonic line or wire. A bug is a miniature electronic device
which overhears, broadcasts, transmits, or records conversations or activities in
the targeted area. Thus, bugs must be installed in the desired area and this
usually requires physical trespass. J. CARR,supra note 15; Zweibon v. Mitchell,
516 F.2d 594, 617-18 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Donner, supra note 19, at 20. Trespassory
bugging was not sanctioned by Section 605, but instead fell under the mandate
of the Olmstead decision. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
22. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 617-18 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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memorandum, as adopted by President Truman," expanded the
scope of permissible nonconsensual electronic surveillance to
cases of suspected subversive activities against the government
and to cases "affecting domestic security, or where human life is
in jeopardy.

'24

Furthermore, the distinction between wiretapping

and trespassory bugging was blurred by the Truman directive
which referred only to "special investigative measures."25 The executive expansion of the Section 605 foreign security exception
went unchecked by the legislature largely due to the pervasive
fear of communist espionage and subversive activities.20 At the
same time, courts lacked the opportunity to review the Justice
Department's actions as the surveillances were typified as investigatory, intragovernmental, and non-evidentiary in nature.
Subsequent Attorney Generals adopted the expansive guidelines of Clark's memorandum and the ancillary bugging procedures developed by prior administrations.28 President Johnson,
however, circumscribed the executive power by authorizing warrantless electronic surveillance, upon approval by the Attorney
General, for the collection of intelligence affecting the national
security.2 9 The cited authorities for the asserted executive powers
23. President Truman's Response to Attorney General Clark's Memorandum, July 17, 1947, reprinted in Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 674 (D.C.
Cir. 1975).
24. Memorandum to President Truman from Attorney General Clark, July
17, 1946, reprinted in Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
25. Id. Prior precedent within the Justice Department allowed electronic
bugging without prior approval of the Attorney General for national security
purposes. Donner, supra note 19, at 20-21. Such bugging avoided prohibition
under the Olmstead Doctrine, even though trespassory, because it was only used
outside of court for the protection of the national security. Donner, supra note
19, at 24.
26. See Brownell, The Public Security and Wire Tapping, 39 CORN. L. Q.
201; Gasque, Wiretapping: A History of Federal Legislation and Supreme
Court Decisions, 15 S.C.L. REV. 610-11 (1963).
27. Attorney General Jackson originally proffered that the Section 605 prohibition against interception and divulgence only precluded courtroom use of wiretap surveillance. Note, The Fourth Amendment and JudicialReview of Foreign
Intelligence Wiretapping; Zweibon v. Mitchell, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 59
(1976); Donner, supra note 19, at 19-20.
28. Donner, supra note 19, at 24; Brownell, supra note 16, at 199-200.
29. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Department and Agencies from
President Johnson, June 30, 1965, reprinted in Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d
594, 674-75 (D.C. Cir. 1975). This policy was effectuated within the Justice Department by Memo No. 493, Memorandum to All United States Attorneys from

724

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 13.719

of domestic security and foreign intelligence surveillance were the
inherent presidential power in the area of foreign relations,30 the
31
President's powers as commander-in-chief of the armed forces,
the power to protect the country from foreign encroachment,32

the President's duty to protect the Constitution,"3 and the President's law enforcement duties." The first three of these rationales

clearly support executive authorization of foreign intelligence surveillance, while the remaining two have been used to justify do-

mestic intelligence surveillance. 5
The Supreme Court, in Katz v. United States,36 overturned the
Ramsey Clark, Acting Attorney General, November 3, 1966, reprintedin part in
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
30. The Constitution states that the President "shall receive Ambassadors
and other public Ministers." U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 3. This clause has been
broadly interpreted, so as to make the President the sole mouthpiece in the area
of foreign relations. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRE-

537 (7th ed. 1974). The Court emphatically declared:
The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the nation's organ for
foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are not and
ought not be published to the world. It would be intolerable that courts,
without the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held secret. Nor can
the courts sit in camera in order to be taken into executive confidences.
But even if courts could require full disclosure, the very nature of the executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution on the political department
of government, Executive and Legislative. They are delicate, complex, and
involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken
only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the judiciary has
neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long been held
to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion
or inquiry.
Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111
(1948).
31. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 1; United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593,
602-03 (3rd Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974); United States v. Clay,
430 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970).
32. United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1973).
33. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1 cL 8; United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 310-11 (1971).

TATION

34. U.S. CONsT. art. 11,

§ 3.

35. Note, Present and Proposed Standards for Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance, 71 N.W.U.L. REV. 112 n. 16 (1976).
36. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

Fall 19801

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT

Olmstead trespass doctrine and found warrantless electronic surveillance an unreasonable search under the fourth amendment.3 7
However, the court specifically reserved judgment on whether alternative safeguards might be substituted for the usual judicial
warrant process in cases involving national security.38 In 1968,
Congress enacted Title lI" which superceded Section 605. Title
III generally requires law enforcement officers to obtain court authorization prior to the initiation of any wiretapping or bugging.'0
Yet, Congress exempted Presidential powers of eavesdropping in
the areas of foreign intelligence, domestic security from attack of
foreign powers, and domestic security from internal subversion
from the purview of Title HI.41 Implicit within these exceptions
and ostensibly corroborated in the legislative history 2 appeared
to be a Congressional recognition of the then broad Presidential
powers to engage in warrantless eavesdropping in the enumerated

37. Id. at 353.
38. Id. at 358 n. 23.
39. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act, Title III, Pub. L. No. 90351, 82 Stat. 212 (Codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520) (1978).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1976). Section 2516 lists the crimes for which eavesdropping to obtain information is permissible with the required court authorization as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1976). This act does provide for warrantless interception of oral or wire communication where one party consents to
such interception, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (1976), and in limited emergency situations 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (1976).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1976) states:
Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of the Communications
Act of 1934 (48 Stat. 1143; 47 U.S.C. 605) shall limit the constitutional
power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to
protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts
of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States, or to protect national security
information against foreign intelligence activities. Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be deemed to limit the constitutional power of the
President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the
United States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other
unlawful means, or against any other clear and present danger to the
structure or existence of the Government. The contents of any wire or oral
communication intercepted by the authority of the President in the exercise of the foregoing powers may be received in evidence at any trial hearing, and shall not be otherwise used or disclosed except as necessary to
implement that power.
42. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2112, 2153.
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areas, limited only by internal executive safeguards.43
The Supreme Court rejected this interpretation in 1971 for domestic national security cases. 44 In United States v. United
States District Court45 [hereinafter Keith], the Court held that
the fourth amendment requires prior judicial approval for the use
of electronic surveillance for purely national security cases, and
that Congress had left untouched Presidential power in cases involving the activities of a foreign power.46 Yet, the Supreme Court
failed to rule upon and specify the permissible scope of the
asserted Presidential power of the use of warrantless electronic
surveillance for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence
information.47
Therefore, a number of circuit courts of appeal ruled upon

these questions when the issues were presented. The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Brown, held that warrantless electronic
surveillance for the purposes of obtaining foreign intelligence information was within the domain of permissible Presidential powers. 4 The Third Circuit, in United States v. Butenko, came to

43. Memorandum from President Johnson, supra note 19.
44. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 303 (1971).
The Court found that the wording of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1976) and its legislative history is merely a recognition of certain areas of asserted Presidential powers and it was not a legislative accession to such powers. The Court gave special
attention to the Senate debate prior to that body's vote. Id. at 306-07; United
States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3rd Cir. 1974).
45. 407 U.S. 297 (1971).
46. The Court limited its inquiry to cases where the Attorney General authorized surveillance "to protect the nation from attempts of domestic organizations to attack and subvert the existing structure of the government." The Court
took this language directly from the affidavit of the Attorney General in support
of the surveillance. Id. at 308-09. The Court, balancing the governmental interest in protecting domestic security with the individual interest of privacy and
freedom of expression, found warrantless domestic security surveillance unreasonable under the fourth amendment. A crucial factor in this determination is
whether a warrant requirement would frustrate the government's legitimate efforts. Id. at 314-15. They found the fourth amendment mandates a warrant issued by a neutral and disinterested magistrate in such cases. Id. at 317.
47. Id.
48. United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 425-26 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960. The Fifth Circuit had previously held in 1970 that a warrantless wiretap authorized by the Attorney General was constitutionally permissible. United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
310.
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the same conclusion, 49 but reasoned that the strong governmental
interest in the continuous flow of information necessary for the
operation of the executive's foreign policy apparatus outweighed
the protection offered by the warrant procedure against possible
abuse of Executive authority.50 The Ninth Circuit also found that
Executive warrantless electronic surveillance was constitutionally
permissible, stating simply that "[fjoreign security wiretaps are a
recognized exception to the general warrant requirement."51 Yet,
no circuit delineated clearly the parameters of this foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement.
Only one circuit, when availed of the opportunity to decide the
issue, failed to sanction broad executive foreign intelligence powers. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in
Zweibon v. Mitchell,52 rejected the propriety of warrantless foreign intelligence electronic surveillance. It held that the fourth
amendment required the issuance of judicial warrant prior to the
wiretapping of a domestic organization which was "neither an
agent of nor acting in collaboration with a foreign power," 53 despite the government's claim that the wiretap was a legitimate
exercise of the executive's foreign intelligence obligation. The
plurality opinion, authored by J. Skelly Wright,5 5 rejected the
government's contention that the subject matter of foreign intelligence surveillance preempted traditional fourth amendment anal49. United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3rd Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 419

U.S. 881.
50. Id. at 605. The court did not say that the Presidential powers in the area
of foreign affairs pre-empted fourth amendment analysis. Id. at 603. Rather, the
court balanced the benefit of prior judicial authorization against the burden of
requiring such a procedure on the intelligence collection apparatus.
51. United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 890 (1979).
52. 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
53. Id. at 613-14.
54. Id. at 614.
55. J. Skelly Wright authored the court's opinion in which Circuit Judges
Leventhal and Robinson concurred and Chief Judge Bazelon concurred in part,
but dissented to the court's mistake of law analysis for a civil suit brought for
the violation of the plaintiff's fourth amendment rights. Circuit Judges McGowan and Robb concurred in the court's result, but felt that it could be
reached on the basis of Title I, without necessitating the court's fourth amendment analysis. Judge Wilkey concurred only upon the constitutional grounds
and dissented on the statutory (Title III) grounds. Judge MacKinnon filed a
dissenting opinion.
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ysis. 56 The court then stated that a warrantless search is presumed to be unreasonable, but such a presumption may be
rebutted if the government has a legitimate need for foreign intelligence eavesdropping and the permissible goal of such surveillance would be frustrated by the warrant process. 57 Wright found
that although there was a legitimate governmental need in acquiring foreign intelligence information, absent exigent circumstances,
the obtaining of a warrant would not unduly interfere in the government's collection of the information.
Chief Judge Bazelon concurred in this fourth amendment analysis, but dissented from Wright's contention that the Attorney
General, as defendant of the civil suit, could effectively assert a
mistake of law defense if he could show a good faith and reasona-

ble belief that it was constitutional to order installation of the

56. The court examined two lines of authority for the government's argument; prior Presidential practice in the area of foreign intelligence eavesdropping and Supreme Court cases heralding broad Presidential powers in the conduct of foreign affairs. The court concluded that neither line supported the
notion that the Executive's power in this area is exempt from judicial review or
that such acts are outside the scope of constitutional limitations. Wright reasoned that since Roosevelt, Truman, and Johnson's memoranda were made
when the Olmstead trespass doctrine was viable and each directive only related
to wiretapping (which was normally outside the scope of the Olmstead doctrine),
then all three Presidential orders failed to alter the fourth amendment warrant
requirement. Id. at 617-18. The opinion then divided the Supreme Court cases
into "three overlapping subclasses: (1) cases finding that our political relations
with foreign governments are non-justiciable; (2) cases recognizing that the
President has certain 'inherent' powers in the field of foreign affairs which are
not dependent upon Congressional authorization; and (3) cases recognizing an
evidentiary privilege shielding information pertaining to military or diplomatic
secrets from disclosure in open court." Id. at 619. Wright went on to distinguish
or show the inapplicability of each of these subclasses to the issue of foreign
intelligence surveillance. Id. at 620-27.
57. Id. at 632-33.
58. Id. at 641-51. The court discussed five factors which might justify abrogation of the warrant requirement for foreign intelligence eavesdropping: (1) judicial competence; (2) the danger of security leaks which might endanger the
lives of the informants and which might seriously harm the national security; (3)
the fact that such surveillance is of the ongoing intelligence -gathering type and
that, since criminal prosecutions are less likely, fourth amendment protections
are not as essential as in a normal criminal context; (4) the possibility that the
delay involved in the warrant procedure might result in substantial harm to the
national security; and (5) the fact that the administrative burden on the courts
or the executive branch which would result from such a requirement would be
enormous.
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warrantless wiretaps involved in the case."9 Both Robinson and
Leventhal joined in the entire Wright opinion. 0
Judge McGowan concurred in the judgment, but felt that the
result could be reached without necessitating Wright's fourth
amendment analysis.6 1 He found thatthe wiretap surveillance of
sixteen members of the Jewish Defense League 2 did not fit
within the Congressional disclaimer to limit any possible Presidential eavesdropping powers of Title II, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3),63
and thus the surveillance fell within the purview of Title InI." He
urged that the statute's exemption of surveillance "necessary to
protect the Nation against. . . hostile acts of a foreign power,"' 5
only became operative if the surveillance was "directed against
agents of or collaborators with the foreign powers whose hostile
acts are feared."66 This was not the situation in the instant case
because the only contemplated hostile act of a foreign power was
the possible reaction of the U.S.S.R. to the Jewish Defense
League's actions.6 Judge Robb filed a similar concurring opinion
which found that the warrantless eavesdropping related to possible domestic crimes enumerated in Title III and thus was violative of the statute.6 6
Judge Wilkey agreed with the plurality opinion that the eavesdropping fell within the meaning of the 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) disclaimers for foreign affairs or domestic security surveillance.6 '

59. Id. at 675-81.
60. Id. at 601.
61. Id. at 681.
62. Plaintiff-appellants were sixteen members of the Jewish Defense League
(J.D.L.), a domestic group, whose focus of activity was aimed at international
affairs. They were especially concerned with Russia's restrictive emigration policy concerning Soviet Jewry. The government maintained that since the J.D.L.
held demonstrations and were implicated in acts of violence aimed at Soviet
officials in the United States, surveillance of this group was within "the Presidential authority relating to the nation's foreign affairs and was deemed essential to protecting the nation and its citizens from hostile acts of a foreign power
and to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security
of the United States." Id. at 607.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 683-85.
Id. at 686.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1976).
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Id. at 685-86.

68. Id. at 688.
69. Id. at 689.

730

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 13:719

Yet, he maintained that the surveillance was only subject to constitutional strictures; thus via Keith Title III procedural requirements and damages are not necessarily applicable.70 He then went
on to reject the government's claim that since the surveillance involved a foreign power "th6 reasonableness standard of the fourth
amendment is met without a warrant," as an overly broad interpretation of a possible foreign affairs exemption." He reasoned
that any fourth amendment warrant requirement exemption must
be based upon overriding governmental interests and that the
typical interests proffered to support a foreign affairs exemption
were of attenuated import when the subjects of the surveillance
were not foreign agents or collaborators."2 In concluding this line
of reasoning, Wilkey distinguished four catagories of surveillance:
(1) surveillance for ordinary criminal cases directly governed by
Title III; (2) domestic security wiretaps which the Supreme Court
in Keith found to be outside of the scope of Title III, but constitutionally warranting prior judicial approval; (3) surveillance
"whose primary purpose is to protect our relations with other
countries" which also constitutionally requires prior judicial approval; and (4) surveillance directed at foreign agents and collaborators which might justify dispensing with prior judicial
approval.7 Judge MacKinnon agreed with Wilkey's opinion except he
found a probable cause determination inapplicable to foreign intelligence surveillance whose purpose was not to collect information relevant to a criminal prosecution.7 4 Thus, six justices appeared to reach the conclusion that the fourth amendment
mandates some sort of prior judicial oversight for foreign intelligence electronic surveillance when the target is neither a foreign
agent nor a collaborator. The Supreme Court has yet to rule on
the interface of the fourth amendment warrant requirement with
electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence collection purposes
within the United States.
70. Id. at 689-99.
71. Wilkey stated: "Weighing the Government's rationale for a sweeping 'for-

eign affairs' exemption to the warrant requirement against the inroads such an
exemption would make on important Fourth and First Amendment values, I

must first conclude that a waiver of such breadth is unjustified." Id. at 700.
72. Id. at 701-05.
73. Id. at 705.
74. Id. at 706-07.
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III.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The unearthing of Executive abuse of warrantless electronic
surveillances in the name of national security during the Watergate investigations catalyzed interest in circumscribing the Executive's power in this area.7 5 This resulted in numerous and varied
congressional hearings on the abuse under the guise of foreign intelligence surveillance18 and no less than four legislative attempts
prior to 1977 to bridle the asserted Executive power.7 7 Senator
Church's Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities was particularly vocal
in its criticism of intelligence agencies' abuse of surveillance authority.7 81 It reported frequent warrantless wiretappings and buggings of United States citizens who were neither engaged in criminal activities, a threat to national security, nor reasonable targets
for the gathering of foreign intelligence information. 79 The Com-

mittee cited the vague standards governing electronic surveillance
and the failure of Congress to act in the area of foreign intelligence surveillance as contributing factors to the problem.80 Yet,
all of these investigations also realized the countervailing interest
75. S. REP. No. 604-Pt. 1, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
AD. NEws 3904, 3908.
76. Hearings on S. 3197 Before the Subcommittee on Intelligence and the
Rights of Americans of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Electronic
Surveillance within the United States for Foreign Intelligence Purposes, 94th
Cong. 2d Sess. (1976); Hearingsbefore the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and
Procedureof the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1976, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Subcommittee on Surveillance of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Subcommittee on
Administrative Practiceand Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Warrantless Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975); Joint Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure and the Subcommittee on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,Warrantless Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
77. S. 3917, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1976, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1976); S. 743, National Security Surveillance Act of 1975, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975); S. 4062, Freedom from Surveillance Act of 1974, 93rd Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974); S. 2820, Surveillance Practices and Procedures Act of 1973, 93rd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
78. See, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, UNITED STATES SENATE, ANNUAL REPORT TO TE SENATE, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 12-16 (committee print,
1977).
79. S. REP. No. 604-Pt. 1 supra note 75, at 7-8.
80. Id. at 8.
CODE CONG. &
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of the government is assembling adequate intelligence to protect
the nation.8 '
In an attempt to balance this countervailing interest and provide a statutory procedure for judicial authorization of electronic
foreign intelligence eavesdropping, Senator Edward M. Kennedy
introduced Senate bill number 1566 on May 18, 1977.82 According

to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report on the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, "[t]he basic premise of the bill is that a court order for foreign intelligence electronic surveillance can be devised that is consistent with the 'reasonable search' requirement of the Fourth Amendment."8
Further, Congress views the statute as a legislative clarification
and advancement of constitutional8 law in an area of uneven and
inconclusive judicial development. '
The statute provided for mandatory procedure for the Attorney
General to attain court approval for electronic foreign intelligence
information collection in the United States, except for surveillance of communications of a foreign power not likely to involve a
United States person. 5 The bill was a continuation and amendment of Senate bill number 3917 [hereinafter S.3917], the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1976, which was also introduced by Senator Kennedy.86 S.3917 received bipartisan
Congressional support, the endorsement of two Senate commitees 8 and an endorsement by the Ford administration, but it
failed to reach the floor of the Senate before the .Ninety-fourth
Congress adjourned. 88 It appears likely that many legislators were
reluctant to enact a bill which reserved a residuum of untouched
Presidential power in the area and which would probably result in
81. Id. at 9.
82. Id.
83. S. REP. No. 701, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 3904, 3977.
84. S.REP. No. 604-Pt. 1, supra note 75, at 15.
85. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1802 (b) (Supp. 1979).
86. S. 3197 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1976, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1976).
87. Both the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedure of the
Committee on the Judiciary and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
held hearings on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1976.
88. See, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978; Hearings on S. 1566
Before the Subcomm. on Intelligence and the Rights of Americans of the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2.
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further confusion about the future exercise of this residuum
power.
Unlike its precursor, Senate bill number 1566, [hereinafter S.
1566] required warrant authorization for electronic eavesdropping
of any international communications of a United States citizen
located within the country. Second, S. 1566 required court review
of the Attorney General's certification of the necessity of eavesdropping on a United States citizen to acquire the desired foreign
intelligence information. Finally, it went beyond the scope of S.
3917 in that it asserted that its procedures were the exclusive
mechanism by which foreign intelligence surveillance could be
conducted within the country.89 These amendments result from
some Senators' reservations voiced during the committee hearings
on S. 3917 and also represented subsequent consultation with
Justice Department officials.9 0
Like its predecessor, the 1978 act received broad-based support, including endorsements by Attorney General Griffin Bell
and President Carter. 91 Hearings on the Act were held by the
Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedure of the Judiciary Committee,92 the Senate Subcommittee on Intelligence
and the Rights of Americans of the Intelligence Committee, 3 and
the House Subcommittee on Legislation of the Intelligence Committee.94 These hearings yielded alterations, the most important
of which was the redrafting of the definition of "agent of a foreign
power" to lessen the possibility of a warrant issuing against a citizen or resident alien without probable cause of involvement in a
criminal activity. 9 5
In addition to Senator Kennedy's bill, introduced by Mr.

89. Id. at 2-3.
90. Id. at 2.
91. Id. at 12-13. (endorsement of Attorney General Griffin B. Bell and quoting President Carter's endorsement); See also S. REP. No. 604-Pt. 1, supra note
75, at 4.
92. Foreign Intelligence Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 1566 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. of the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
93. Hearings on S. 1566, supra note 89.
94. ForeignIntelligence Electronic Surveillance:Hearingon H.R. 5794, H.R.
9754, H.R. 7308, and H.R. 5632 Before the House Subcomm. on Legislation of
the Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977).
95. S. RFP. No. 604-Pt. 1, supra note 75, at 4.
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Rodino9 6 in the House and bearing the bill number of H.R. 7038,
three other proposals were before the House subcommittee. The
Railsback and Kastenmeir bills also provided for the safeguard of
a prior judicial warrant in foreign security cases.9 7 The Railsback
bill was very similar to FISA.9 8 The Kastenmeir bill provided that
a warrant could issue upon a mere showing that there was reason
to believe foreign intelligence information could be obtained, but
it greatly restricted the scope of activity that the court warrant
could authorize.9 9 The McClory bill sought only a three step internal executive control procedure for authorization of electronic

surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information. 100 After
comparing the alternative proposals and evaluating the testimony
of eighteen witnesses, the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence recommended passage of S. 1566.101 The Senate considered and passed this bill on April 20, 1978.102 The House
passed its own version on September 7, 1978 and sent its amendments to the Senate.10 3 After the House conference report was
filed, both bodies passed the amended bill and President Carter
96. Hearings on H.R. 5794, H.R. 9745, H.R. 7308 and H.R. 5632, supra note
95, at 2 (Railsback bill was H.R. 5794 and Kastenmeir bill was H.R. 5632).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2, 67.
100. Id. at 275 (Appendix B reprint of H.R. 9745). McClory felt that since
different circumstances necessitated foreign intelligence surveillance than necessitated searches and seizures for strictly law enforcement purposes prior judicial
authorization was inappropriate. He felt that certification by the President, the
Attorney General, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs both protected individuals from abuse of this power and satisfied the mandates of the fourth amendment. The certificate had to specify among other
things: (1) the target of the electronic surveillance; (2) the facts and circumstances which support the belief that foreign intelligence information would be
obtained; (3) the minimization procedures; (4) if the target were a foreign power,
the nature of the information sought; (5) statements that foreign intelligence
information is being sought; (6) other procedures could be fruitless; (7) the period of the proposed surveillance; and (8) the means by which the surveillance
was to be effectuated. Id. at 3 and 272-75.
101. H.R. REP. No. 1283-Pt. 1, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 1 (1978).
102. 124 CONG. REc. S5994-6019 (daily ed. April 20, 1978).
103. 124 CONG. REc. H9237-9273 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1978).
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signed it into law.1 0 4
IV. THE

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF

A.

1978

Scope of the Act

The boundaries of FISA are primarily delimited by the statute's definitions of foreign intelligence information, 10 5 electronic
surveillance, 1 8 foreign power, 10 7 and agent of a foreign power.1 08
A prerequisite to the Act's applicability is that either the sender,
the intended recipient, or both must be located within the United
States.1 09 Communications wholly outside the United States, even
though they involve United States citizens, are not covered by
FISA or Title 111,10 and international communications of a citizen within the country are covered only if the interception was
made by intentionally targeting the person. 1 The interception of
the communication content 11 2 must be made by an electronic,
mechanical, or other surveillance device.1 13 One party consensual
114
eavesdropping is excluded from the statute's purview.
FISA regulates only surveillance that falls within one of the five
partially overlapping categories that define activities or areas the
knowledge of which constitutes foreign intelligence information.
These categories include information regarding: (1) foreign military capabilities or actions which would directly affect the national security; (2) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or its agents; (3) spying by foreign intelligence
networks; (4) national defense or the security of the United
104. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 14 Weekly Comp. of Pres.

Doc. 1853 (Oct. 25, 1978).

105. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(e) (Supp. 1979).
106. 50 U.S.C.A.
107. 50 U.S.C.A.
108. 50 U.S.C.A.
109. 50 U.S.C.A.
84, at 33-38.

§1801(f) (Supp. 1979).
§1801(a) (Supp. 1979).
§1801(b) (Supp. 1979).
§1801 (f)(1)-(4) (Supp. 1979); S. REP. No. 701, supra note

110. Title HI regulates primarily domestic electronic surveillance and prior
to 1978 it specifically excepted foreign intelligence surveillance. FISA is prima-

rily an addendum to the coverage of Title HI. Congress provided conforming
amendments to Chapter 119 of Title 18, United States Code as part of FISA to
assure the integration of the two statutes.
111.
112.
113.

50 U.S.C.A. §1801 (f) (1) (Supp. 1979).
Pen registers are not within the purview of this statute.
50 U.S.C.A. §1801 (f) (1)-(4) (Supp. 1979).

114. 50 U.S.C.A. §1801(e) (2)-(4) (Supp. 1979).
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States; and (5) conduct of United States foreign policy. 115 Inclusion in this genre, and thus within the Act's provisions, further
depends on whether the information sought concerns a United
States person (a citizen or legal alien) or not. 116 If it does, then
the information must not merely relate to one of the five categories of foreign intelligence information, but rather it must be necessary to the collection of information specified by the category.11 7 Since this statute in-conjunction with Title III represents
a complete statutory interpretation of the parameters of permissible electronic eavesdropping within the country, 1 ' it provides a
stricter standard of fourth amendment review for foreign intelligence surveillance involving a United States person than a nonUnited States person.
Finally, the target of the surveillance covered in the Act must
be believed to be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power. 19 The drafters of the statute broadly defined foreign
power to include: (1) an official foreign government and its components; (2) a foreign faction (not officially recognized) not substantially composed of United States persons; (3) entities acknowledged to be controlled by a foreign government; (4) a
foreign based terrorist group; (5) a foreign based group, not substantially composed of United States persons; and (6) a commercial entity directed and controlled by a foreign government, but
not merely an enterprise that is under a contractual duty to a
foreign government.1 2 The common denominator of these six categories is that control of the entity must be with a group of nonUnited States persons.
The target of the statute's surveillance may also be an agent of
a foreign power. This definition includes officers and employees of
a foreign power who are not United States persons.1 21 There is a

legislative presumption that .non-resident aliens working for a foreign power in this country are likely sources of foreign intelligence information. 22 The definition also includes non-United
States persons who act for foreign powers engaged in clandestine
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

50 U.S.C.A.
50 U.S.C.A.
50. U.S.C.A.
S. REP. No.
50 U.S.C.A.
50 U.S.C.A.
50 U.S.C.A.
S. REP. No.

§1801 (e) (1)-(2) (Supp. 1979).
§1801 (i) (Supp. 1979).
§1801 (e) (1)-(2) (Supp. 1979).
701, supra note 83, at 5.
§1804 (a) (4) (b) (Supp. 1979).
§1801 (a) (1)-(6) (Supp. 1979).
§1801 (b) (1) (A) (Supp. 1979).
701, supra note 83, at 19.
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intelligence collection operations of the United States, "when the
circumstances of such person's presence in the United States, indicates that such person may engage in such activities in the
United States."'12 Thus, a foreign visitor acting for a foreign government or employed by a foreign government may be subjected
to surveillance under FISA without showing that he has or may
commit any criminal offense.12'4 The definition also includes any

person who knowingly engages in activities constituting spying

against the United States interest, sabotage, 125 international ter-

rorism and preparation for such terrorism, or aiding and abetting
any such activities. 128 Thus, for a citizen or resident alien to be

the target of permissible FISA surveillance, there will generally
be suspicion of the violation of a criminal statute. This is akin to
the protection afforded all persons subject to surveillance pursuant to Title III.' 2 7 Title Ill requires a full and a complete state-

ment of the facts and circumstances demonstrating probable
cause that a listed offense has, is, or is about to be committed.1

B.

28

§ 1802 (a) Limited Executive Authorized Electronic
Surveillance

FISA permits the executive branch to engage in domestic warrantless eavesdropping for the purpose of assembling foreign intelligence information only in extremely limited circumstances
and only after scrutiny of systematic internal checks and limitations. Upon an intelligence agency's application for § 1802 (a) surveillance, the Attorney General must ascertain and certify in a
sworn document that three conditions exist. 29 First, the target of
the eavesdropping must be either a "means of communication
used exclusively between or among foreign powers" or technical
non-vocal data emanating from property exclusively controlled by
a foreign power.130 Second, that no substantial likelihood of acquisition of a communication to which a United States person is a
123. 50 U.S.C.A. §1801 (b) (1) (B) (Supp. 1979).
124. S. REP. No. 702, supra note 83, at 20.

125. Sabotage is defined by reference to 18 U.S.C., Chapter 105. 50 U.S.C.A.
§ 1801 (d)(Supp. 1979).
126. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801 (c) (Supp. 1979).

127. 18 UJ.S.C. § 2516 (1) (a) (1976).

128. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1) (b) (1976).
129. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1802 (a) (1) (Supp. 1979).
130. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1802 (a) (1) (A) (i)-(ii) (Supp. 1979).
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party exists.' 3 ' Last, that the proposed surveillance fits within
previously adopted and Congressionally ratified'3 2 procedures
which assure minimal acquisition, retention, and dissemination of
private information concerning United States persons. 3 This
written certification is sealed and submitted to a designated court
and is opened only upon challenge of the legality of the surveillance or if the government later applies for a warrant for the same
surveillance. 34 Bugging under this section is limited in duration
to one year. 1 35 Title III does not have a similar statutorily prescribed procedure for executive issued surveillance without judicial review.
C. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Pursuant to Court
Authorization, § 1802 (b) - § 1805 (d)
FISA institutes a system of internal (executive) and external
(judicial) checks upon the implementation of permissible foreign
intelligence electronic surveillance. In some respects the internal
procedural protections afforded United States citizens and resident aliens and the resultant administrative encumbrances in attaining judicial authorization are greater than those of Title III.
FISA surveillance requires review by a presenting officer, the Attorney General, and the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs. 1' An initial control in the process requires that
a federal officer, in writing and upon his oath, submit an application for an order allowing eavesdropping for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information. 37 If the officer cannot
swear to his personal knowledge of any of the listed criteria in the
application, he must obtain an affidavit of an investigating or
other officer who is cognizant of the basis of those assertions or of
the assertions of the informer. 1 8
131. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1802 (a) (1) (B) (Supp. 1979).
132. The act provides that the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence shall review a report
from the Attorney General on the compliance with and effectuation of minimiza-

tion procedures and further supply notification of any changes in such procedure. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1802 (a) (1) (Supp. 1979).

133. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801 (h) (Supp. 1979).
134. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1802 (a) (3) (Supp. 1979).

135. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1802 (a) (1) (Supp. 1979).
136. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1804 (a) and (a) (7) (Supp. 1979).
137. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1804 (a) (Supp. 1979).

138. S. REP. No. 701 supra note 82, at 49. If informers are to be used the
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Every application for authorization of foreign intelligence surveillance must contain an averment to or proof of the following:
(1) the identity of the presenting federal officer; 139 (2) evidence of
the authority of the Attorney General granted by the President
and approval of the application pursuant to this authority;14 0 (3)
the identity of the targeted person, if known, or a description of
the targeted person, if known, or a description of the targeted entity;14 1 (4) the facts which support the reasonable belief that the
target of the surveillance is either a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power and that the facilities or premises to be invaded are
likely to be used by such a defined person or entity;1 42 (5) "a
statement of the proposed minimization procedures; ' 143 (6) a report of any prior application for surveillance of the targeted person, facilities, or premises;14 4 and (7) a statement of the expected
or required duration of the bugging.14' Every application must
also contain an appended certification by the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs which attests to the fact
that: (a) he believes that the information sought is foreign intelligence information; (b) the actual purpose of the electronic eavesdropping is to get such information; (c) other surveillance techniques would be unfruitful; and (d) the information sought fits
one of the five categories deliniating foreign intelligence surveillance and the certification designates the category. 14
These are the requisite criteria for an application for judicial
ratification of eavesdropping on a foreign government where the
targeted facility is in the United States and controlled by the
foreign government.14 7 Each of these application criteria has a
counterpart in Title III except that there is nothing akin to the

Spinelli v. United States, 394 U.S. 410 (1969) standards of proving the basis of
the informer's knowledge and his reliability must be demonstrated.
139. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1804 (a) (1) (Supp. 1979).
140. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1804 (a) (2) (Supp. 1979).
141. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1804 (a) (3) (Supp. 1979).
142. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1804 (a) (4) (Supp. 1979).
143. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1804 (a) (9) (Supp. 1979).

144. Id.
145. 50 U.S..C.A. § 1804 (a) (10) (Supp. 1979).
146. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1804 (a) (7) (A)-(D) (Supp. 1979). The third criterion is
met either by showing that prior noni electronic surveillance techniques proved
useless or that under the circumstances one would expect such methods to prove
fruitless.
147. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1804 (b) (Supp. 1979).
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auxiliary screening provided by the detailed certification of the
Presidential Assistant, 4" nor is there a recitation of the Attorney
General's authority in Title III.148 Although the minimization
procedure generally parallels 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (5) of Title HI in
that both are designed to diminish unnecessary acquisition of private and non-utilitarian overheard information and dissemination, the procedures under FISA are more detailed, only apply to
United States persons, and must be specified in the
application. 150
If the electronic eavesdropping is not targeted at a foreign government facility, then the application must also include: "A detailed description of the nature of the information sought or the
activities to be subject to the surveillance"; 15' a statement of how
the surveillance is to be effectuated and whether or not physical
entry upon the targeted premises to install an electronic device is
required; 152 and a statement of when multiple eavesdropping de-

vices are to be used, a cataloging of each device, its proposed coverage, and individualized minimization procedures.1 53 Finally, the

certification by the Presidential Assistant must also include a
statement which justifies the conclusions that the targeted information is foreign intelligence in character and that such information could not be reasonably obtained by alternative methods.'"
Title III does not require the applicant to divulge how the surveillance will be effectuated nor does it mandate a cataloging for
148. Although Title

m does not have a secondary Executive review proce-

dure analogous to the FISA certification procedure, it does not mandate investigation of similar questions prior to the issuance of a judicial warrant. 18 U.S.C. §
2518 (3) (1976). These determinations under Title M are made by the judge

reviewing the application on the basis of the facts submitted and any other evidence the judge requested the applicant to supply. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1)-(3).
149. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1) (a) (1976), (identification of the presenting officer);
18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1) (b) (iv) (1976), (identity of targeted person); 18 U.S.C. §
2518 (1) (b) (i) (1976), (belief that criminal activity targeted, paralleling belief

that the target is a foreign power or foreign agent); 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1) (e)
(1976), (prior applications for surveillance); 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1) (d) (1976),

(statement of the proposed duration of surveillance).
150. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801 (h) (Supp. 1979).
151.

Compare 50 U.S.C. § 1804 (a) (5) (Supp. 1979) and 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (5)

(1976).
152. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1804 (a) (6) (Supp. 1979).
153. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1804 (a) (8) (Supp. 1979).
154. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1804 (a) (11) (Supp. 1979).
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multiple eavesdropping devices within a single surveillance. 155
FISA then requires an equal, if not more thorough, application
for surveillance than Title III and most importantly requires a
two-step Executive review process prior to judicial submission of
the application. These added internal safeguards may prove cumbersome, especially in times of international turmoil when the
need for intelligence is acute and immediate.15
Subsequent to this two-step Executive review process, the application is then presented to one of the seven United States District Court judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court to hear FISA cases.1 57 Significant judicial review is limited
to a determination of: (1) whether there is probable cause the
person who is the target of the eavesdropping is a "foreign power"
or a "foreign agent" as defined in the act, and whether the
targeted place is likely to be used by such a targeted person;15 (2)
whether the application complies with the statutory requirement
that the procedures delineated in the application insure minimization of "acquisition, retention, and dissemination of information concerning citizens or resident aliens," if applicable; 5 9 and
(3) whether the application possesses the required statements and
averments.'8 0 In addition, if the target of the asked-for surveillance is a United States person, there is an inquiry whether the
statements in the certification are clearly erroneous (these statements relate to the foreign intelligence character and the need of

155. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1804 (a) (7) (E) (Supp. 1979).
156. The emergency surveillance provision of 50 U.S.C.A. § 1802 (a) (Supp.
1979) provides little relief to this problem. See text accompanying notes 129-35,

supra.
157.

50 U.S.C.A. § 1805 (a). The designation of the judges is provided for in

50 U.S.C.A. § 1803 (a) (Supp. 1979).
158. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805 (a) (3) (Supp. 1979). There is also a review of the
President's authorization of the Attorney General to approve the application for

surveillance, 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805 (a) (1) (Supp. 1979), and a check to insure that
a federal officer made the application. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805 (a) (2) (Supp. 1979).
The legislative history reflects that traditional inquiries into an informant's reli-

ability and the basis of his knowledge is also to be scrutinized by the court in
determining probable cause of 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805 (a) (3) (Supp. 1979). S. REP.

No. 701, supra note 84, at 53.
159. S. REP. No. 701, supra note 83, at 53-54.
160. This is not a probe into the factual basis of each of these statements or
averments, but merely a check of their existence. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805 (a) (5)
(Supp. 1979).

742

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 13:719

the surveillance)." 1 The judge can request further information
from the applicant to make this determination."0 2 In essence, if
the target of the proposed surveillance is a United States person,
a comparable level of judicial scrutiny of an application for foreign intelligence electronic surveillance is required as would be
required for an application for domestic criminal surveillance
under Title III.18s The degree of scrutiny for surveillance of a
non-United States person is less than either of these.'"
The judge, if satisfied that the application meets these criteria,
then enters an ex parte order sanctioning the surveillance. 6" The
order for a search where the target is not a foreign government,
its entity, or a foreign faction is required to specify or describe:
(1) the targeted individual; (2) the targeted location; (3)) the type
of information and communications sought; (4) the means by
which the surveillance is to be effectuated; (5) the permissible duration of the surveillance (the maximum period being ninety
days, while the maximum permissible period for Title III is thirty
days)1 66; and the limitations and minimization procedure for each
surveillance device. 1 7 However, if the target of the eavesdropping

is either a foreign government, an entity of a foreign government,
or a foreign political faction or splinter group, the order need not
be so detailed, 88 and the minimum duration of surveillance under
161. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805 (a) (5) (Supp. 1979).
162. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1804 (d) (Supp. 1979).
163. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (3) (1976) requires the judge to determine that four
criteria exist from the facts alleged before issuance of a judicial warrant for electronic eavesdropping: (i) probable cause for belief that the target committed an
enumerated offense; (ii) probable cause to believe that the communications concerning the offense would be intercepted; (iii) nonelectronic surveillance had
proved or would prove to be fruitless; and (iv) probable cause to believe that the
targeted premises was owned or leased by the targeted person or used or to be
used in connection with the probable crime.
164. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805 (a) (Supp. 1979).
165. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805 (c) (Supp. 1979).
166. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805 (d) (1) (Supp. 1979). The maximum term for any
order for electronic surveillance or extension of an order under Title Im is thirty
days. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (5) (1976).
167. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805 (b) (1) (A)-(F) (Supp. 1979).
168. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805 (c) (Supp. 1979) provides that such an order (if the
target of the electronic eavesdropping fits within the definition of foreign powers
set out in 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801 (a) (1), (2), or (3) may omit statements concerning
the type of information sought and the communications to be seized, the means
of effectuating the surveillance, and the number of bugs or taps to be used. Instead, a general statement as to these points suffices.
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the order is raised to one year.16 9 Generally, extensions of a surveillance order may be granted by the district judge on the same
basis and for the same maximum term as applied to the original
order. 170 Further, the court retains the power to review prior to or
at the end of the terms of ordered eavesdropping the manner in
which any acquired information concerning a citizen or a resident
alien is being handled (i.e. minimization procedure).1 7 1
D. Emergency Exceptions to the Warrant Procedure
Besides the limited warrantless surveillance provided in § 1802
(a),17 1 the Act allows the normal warrant procedure to be suspended in two situations. First, if the Attorney General reasonably ascertains that an emergency need exists for electronic foreign
intelligence surveillance1 7 3 and finds that the factual basis for the
issuance of a judicial order exists,1 7 ' he may order the surveillance, so long as he requires adherence to minimization procedures. 7 5 Concurrently, he must notify a designated district court
judge17 of his decision.17 7 This emergency surveillance must discontinue at the end of twenty-four hours unless court approval is
obtained in the interim.17 8 The emergency provision of Title H179
is much broader and contains fewer procedural requisites.18 0 Any
law enforcement officer designated by the Attorney General or by

169. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805 (d) (1) (Supp. 1979).
170. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805 (d) (2) (Supp. 1979). This section does provide that
an extension up to one year may be granted for electronic surveillance targeted
at international terrorism, a foreign entity controlled by a foreign government,
or a foreign based political group if the judge determines no communications of
a citizen or resident alien will be intercepted.
171. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(d)(3) (Supp. 1979). This judicial review of compliance with minimization procedures is not obligatory. S. REP. No. 701, supra note
83, at 57.
172.

See p. 671 supra.

173. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(e)(1) (Supp. 1979).
174. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(e)(2) (Supp. 1979).
175. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(e) (Supp. 1979).
176.

See p. 671 supra.

177. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805(e) (Supp. 1979).
178. Id.
179. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (1976). The grounds for the emergency exception to
the warrant requirement in Title MI are conspiratorial activities affecting national security or concerning organized crime which mandate immediate
surveillance.

180. S. REP. No. 701, supra note 83, at 57.
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any state attorney general may make the necessary determinations to institute emergency surveillance. 18 1 Emergency surveillance under Title III can be maintained for forty-eight hours
without filing an application for a judicial order, and after the
application is made the surveillance can continue indefinitely until the court refuses to sanction it and denies the application. 182
Second, FISA provides a very narrow exception to the warant
procedure which allows fifteen days of Executive order electronic
surveillance subsequent to a congressional declaration of war. 8 8
E. Use of the Surveillance Product
Inter-law enforcement agency 8 use of any information acquired pursuant to FISA [hereinafter FISA information] and pertaining to a citizen or resident alien is regulated by the minimization procedures, which restrict the use to purely foreign
intelligence or criminal law enforcement purposes. 8 5 Any information so obtained may only be used for lawful purposes.18s Evidentiary use of FISA information is permitted in procedures
before federal, state, and local courts, administrative bodies, or
other political bodies or authorities, but only if notice of the intention to use it is given to the "aggrieved person '' s8 within a
reasonable time prior to the proceeding.' This party may then
move to suppress the evidence in a pre-trial motion on the statutory grounds of unlawful acquisition of the information or governmental failure to conform to the order or authorization for electronic surveillance. 189 Title Ill provides comparable provisions
181.

18 U.S.C. § 2518(7) (1976).

Id.
50 U.S.C.A. § 1811 (Supp. 1979).
The act also contemplates dissemination of information acquired pursuFISA surveillance to non-governmental officials in limited situations. S.
REP. No. 604-pt.1, supra note 75, at 54.
182.
183.
184.
ant to

185. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1806(a) (Supp. 1979); H.R. REP. No. 1283, 95th Cong., 2d

Sess. 87 (1978).
186. This protection runs not only to "United States persons," but also to
foreign visitors and non-resident aliens. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1806(a) (Supp. 1979).
Lawful purposes restricts the use of FISA information to actual foreign intelligence purposes and the enforcement of the criminal law. S. REP. No. 701, supra
note 83, at 59.
187. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(k) (Supp. 1979). Aggrieved person is synonymous

with the subject of the electronic surveillance.
188. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1806(c),(d) (Supp. 1979).

189. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1806(d) (Supp. 1979). These two statutory grounds for
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restricting law enforcement agency use of eavesdropping information,19 0 requiring notice prior to evidentiary use,1 and delineating non-exclusive statutory grounds for challenging the introduction of the information in official proceedings. 19 2 Title III further
requires that the court give the parties notice of the judicial order
sanctioning electronic eavesdropping, within ninety days of the
order's entry. 19 3 FISA has no comparable provision because of the
sensitivity of divulging such information in the foreign intelli94
gence area.1
Both acts provide the opportunity for a pre-trial exclusionary
hearing for statutory or other challenge to the admission into evidence or disclosure of the eavesdrop-attained information. 9 5 Title
III gives the judge discretion to determine the portions of the intercepted communications the aggrieved person may review "in
the interest of justice."'1 6 The implication is that only if the government can show exigent circumstances which warrant retention
of the information will the targeted person be prohibited from
seeing all or some of the transcript, prior to or at the hearing.9
FISA on the other hand, states: "the court may disclose to the
aggrieved person, under appropriate procedures and protective
orders, portions of the application, order, or other materials relating to the surveillance only when such disclosure is necessary to
make an accurate determination of the legality of the surveilchallenging admission of FISA information are not pre-emptive of other challenges, but it would appear any fourth amendment challenge would be subsumed within the unlawful acquisition statutory challenge. No matter what the
basis of the motion is, this statutory procedure must be adhered to. See S. REP.
No. 604-pt.1, supra note 75, at 56.

190. 18 U.S.C. § 2517 (1976).
191. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1976).
192. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1976). This subsection provides an additional
ground for exclusion of the surveillance information based upon a finding that
the authorization was deficient in some respect on its face. 18 U.S.C. §
2518(10)(a)(ii) (1976).
193. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1976).
194. See S. REP. No. 604-pt.1, supra note 75, at 82-83.

195. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1806(e) (Supp. 1979) FISA; 18 U.S.C. § 2528(10)(a) (1976)
Title

I.

196. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1976).
197. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1968] U.S.

CODE

& AD. NEws 2195-96. In addition Title III requires law enforcement officers to record any intercepted conversations if at all feasible. Thus, a transcript
or at least a recording is usually available. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a). FISA has no
comparable provision.
CONG.
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lance."1 8 The presumption is that the party may not review any
of the government's materials unless he can meet the burden of
demonstrating their indispensibility to his motion. Unless some
privilege is the basis of the aggrieved party's motion, there would
be no basis for requesting a transcript of the intercepted communications and normally only a copy of the application for surveillance and the court order would be available. 199
In addition, under FISA the government, via the Attorney General, possesses the power to circumvent the normal hearing procedure for challenging the admission of electronically attained information. 200 The Attorney General need only swear by affidavit
that either convening an adversary hearing or allowing any disclosure of the surveillance application or its order would jeopardize
national security, to preempt such a proceeding. 2 1 Then he must
file a copy of the surveillance application and the order with the
court. 20 2 The court then makes an ex parte and in camera decision of whether the surveillance was lawful, and discloses its decision to the aggrieved party with any portion of the application,
the order, or other materials it deems may be unveiled. 20 This
government ability to force exclusion of the adversary party from
a hearing on the admissibility of FISA information is predicated
entirely upon the need for protection of national security
2 °4
interests.
F.

Enforcement and CongressionalOversight

Both acts provide the dual enforcement mechanism of criminal
sanctions for intentional unauthorized electronic surveillance or
disclosure of information from a known illegal bug or tap 20 5 and a
concurrent statutory civil cause of action for damages. 20 6 Both

198.
199.
200.

50 U.S.C.A. § 1806(f) (Supp. 1979).
S. REP. No. 701, supra note 83, at 63-64.
50 U.S.C.A. § 1806(f) (Supp. 1979).

201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. S. REP. No. 701, supra note 83, at 64. Title I has no provision even
remotely akin to this empowering of the Attorney General.
205. Compare 50 U.S.C.A. § 1809 (Supp. 1979) with 18 U.S.C. § 2511(a)

(1976).
206. FISA provides that violations of the criminal proviso invokes the statutory civil damage cause of action. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1810 (Supp. 1979). Title HI
establishes a civil damage cause of action for any violation of the act whether it
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acts also require that the Attorney General submit reports on all
surveillance conducted pursuant to the application statute. Title
III requires filing of a yearly detailed report by the United States
Attorney General and state attorneys general or their appointed
subordinates to a United States court." 7 The court in turn submits an annual report to Congress. 208 FISA requires the United
States Attorney General to "fully inform" the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on a semi-annual basis of all surveillance conducted pursuant to the Act.209 It is unclear whether a written report, oral testimony, or both are envisioned by this duty, but it is
clear that whatever mode is adopted, it must be detailed enough
to allow the committees to understand the breadth, regularity,
and purpose of such surveillance. 2 10 This means that the Attorney

General must gather, analyze, and report on each agency which
acted under FISA. The legislative justification for this close scrutiny is the lack of routine notice to the surveillance target, the
expectation that few FISA surveillances will culminate in criminal
trials, and the limited judicial review by just a few justices who
may be closely aligned with the requesting parties. 211 The two
Congressional committees report to their respective houses of
Congress on the Act's implementation for each of five years after
enactment of the statute and they are to append recommendations for amendments.212
V.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

A threshold issue addressed in Congressional subcommittee
hearings 23 and committee reports 214 is whether the legislature has
the authority to circumscribe what has generally been thought of
be due to negligence or whether it is intentional. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1976).
207. 18 U.S.C. § 2519(2) (1976). Unlike FISA's vague standard for informing
Congress of activities pursuant to it, this section of Title I specifies seven

points which a report to the United States court must contain.

208. 18 U.S.C. § 2519(3) (1976).
209. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1808(a) (Supp. 1979).
210. S. REP. No. 701, supra note 83, at 67.
211. Id.
212. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1808(b) (Supp. 1979).
213. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 1566
Before the Subcomm. on Intelligence and the Rights of Americans of the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-28, 133 (1978).
214. S. REP. No. 604-pt.1, supra note 75, at 16.
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as a purely Executive power to initiate warrantless foreign intelligence eavesdropping. Although there has been a wide discrepancy
among constitutional authorities as to the existence and breadth
of an inherent power of the President to act unchecked in this
area,21 5 at least one United States appellate court has recognized
broad and seemingly immutable Executive authority. In United
States v. Brown, the Fifth Circuit stated that:
because of the President's constitutional duty to act for the United
States in the field of foreign relations, and his inherent power to
protect national security in the context of foreign affairs ... the
President may constitutionally authorize warrantless wiretaps for
Restrictions
the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence ....
upon the President's power which are appropriate in cases of domestic security become artificial in the context of the international
sphere.2 16
Assuming arguendo that an inherent Presidential power to collect foreign intelligence exists, the constitutional basis for this
power is found in the Presidential power to act as commander-inchief of the armed forces, 2 17 the Presidential duty to preserve,
protect, and defend the Constitution, 218 and inherent powers emanating from the Presidential status as the sole mouthpiece of the
nation in dealing with other countries. 2 19 Congress as recently as
1973 acted to redefine and restrict the President's commander-inchief power, via passage over Presidential veto of the War Powers
Resolution. 220 Further, Congress has, at times, exercised its powers in an effort to curtail Presidential powers in the conducting of
foreign affairs. 2 1 Since Congress clearly may limit the powers
which form the foundation of the Presidential power to collect
foreign intelligence, it appears logical that the emanating power is
also subject to legislative curtailment.
Some authorities have maintained that congressional regulation
of the basal powers is non-analogous to the case of an inherent
215. Electronic Surveillance Within the United States for Foreign Intelligence Purposes:Hearings on S. 3197 Before the Subcomm. on Intelligence and
the Rights of Americans of the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1977) (Statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy).
216. 484 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1973).
217. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
218. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
219. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, supra note 30.
220. War Power Resolution, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1541-48 (Supp. 1979).
221. L. TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONsTrrtI ONAL LAW 163-67 (1978).
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power.2 2 2 This is premised upon the faulty assumption that all
inherent powers of the President equate with plenary powers.
The Supreme Court, in Myers v. United States, suggested that
not all inherent powers are unlimited or limited only by specific
constitutional proscriptions. 2 3 Further, in the absence of explicit
constitutional delegation or congressional recognition and ratification of a claimed inherent executive power, 224 the legislature re225
tains the authority to regulate or preclude executive authority.
This analysis by Justice Jackson in Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer
was the authority which Congress cited when it rather summarily
decided that it had the authority to enact FISA.226
A more perplexing issue raised by the statute is whether the
procedures and provisions for limited warrantless and court sanctioned electronic surveillance are violative of the fourth amendment. Implicit within the basic premise and purpose of the stat227
ute is the recognition of the fourth amendment's applicability,
and rejection of the premise that there exists an absolute national
security exception to the amendment. 22 Yet, the amendment's
applicability does not automatically mandate usage of the prior
judicial warrant procedure, as it must at least be shown that it is
reasonable to procure a search warrant. 229 The relevant test is
whether a warrant requirement would "frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search. ' 23 0 Even if a warrant procedure is
appropriate, the Supreme Court said in Keith, "the warrant application may vary according to the governmental interest to be
enforced and the nature of the citizen right deserving protection." 231 This fourth amendment analysis is the theoretical basis
of FISA's two provisions authorizing and prescribing procedures
for electronic foreign intelligence surveillance.

222. Id. at 159.
223. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); L. TRIE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 159 (1978).
224. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 30,
at 544-55.
225. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 637 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
226. S. REP. No. 604-pt.1, supra note 75, at 16.
227. S. REP. No. 701, supra note 83, at 9.
228. S. REP. No. 604-pt.1, supra note 75, at 16.
229. 2 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.1 (a) (1978).
230. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 522, 533 (1967).
231. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 323 (1972).
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One criticism of the judicial warrant procedure stems from the
possibility that the surveillance authorization may issue against a
United States person without a finding of probable cause that a
crime has, is being, or is about to be committed and that there
need not be a showing that evidence of criminal activity will be
seized.2 32 Proponents of the bill argue that the possibility of warrantless surveillance aimed at a United States person under FISA
is extremely limited in lieu of the House amendment of the definition of an agent of a foreign power.2 3 3 Furthermore, they maintain there is constitutional authority for searches without such
probable cause, and the Supreme Court has insinuated that a
broader focus of probable cause may be appropriate in cases in2 34
volving national security.
The statute's proponents rely on Camara v. Municipal Court2 3 5
and See v. Seattle23 6 as one line of authority supporting the notion that a judicial search warrant may issue upon a finding of
something less than criminal probable cause. These cases held
that although a warrant was required for housing code inspections
or searches and business premises searches, such a warrant could
issue without a showing of the inspector's belief that a particular
dwelling or business was in violation of the relevant municipal
code.2 37 The Court went on to say in Camara that area code-enforcement inspections pursuant to a warrant are reasonable under
the fourth amendment, 8 and that probable cause to issue such a
warrant is met "if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect
to a particular dwelling." 239 Thus, the quantum of evidence required for a code-enforcement inspection warrant is less than for
a criminal warrant (i.e. criminal probable cause).

232. Hearingson S. 1566, supra note 213, at 112-13, (Prepared Statement of
John H. F. Shattuck, Director, Washington Office, and Jerry J. Berman, Legisla-

tive Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union).
233. Hearings on S. 1566, supra note 213, at 14 (Prepared Statement of
Hon. Griffin B. Bell, Attorney General of the United States).
234. Id. at 15.
235. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
236. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).

237. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. Seattle, 387 U.S.
541 (1967).
238. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).

239. Id. at 538.
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The Court justified this holding upon three factors. 240 First,

area code-enforcement inspections had a history of judicial and
public acceptance. Second, there was an overriding public interest
coupled with the inadequacy of alternative enforcement methods.
Third, the inspections were a limited invasion of an individual's
privacy because they were not aimed at the discovery of criminal
evidence nor were they personal in nature. This essentially is a
balancing of governmental interest in the need to search with the
individual's privacy interest. A similar analysis supported "stop
and frisk ' "41 and airport searches 242 upon a finding of less than
criminal probable cause.
Likewise, warrantless foreign intelligence electronic surveillance
has historically received judicial and public acceptance, and although there has not been strong precedent for non-criminal
probable cause determinations to support the issuance of an order
for such surveillance, there was wide support for such a measure
as evidenced by the passage of FISA. 4 3 It is also maintained that
there is an overriding governmental need for foreign intelligence
and that other modes of acquisition of such information have
proved fruitless or of attenuated value. Finally, although it can be
argued that the purpose of the surveillance is not the collection of
evidence for criminal prosecutions, it is not true that electronic
surveillance is a less pervasive intrusion than a normal search for
criminal evidence.2 Thus, the balance of these factors is not
clear as in the Camara and See cases and the "stop and frisk"
cases.
The government also rests its assertion that foreign intelligence
electronic surveillance can be sustained by a finding of less than
criminal probable cause on the fact that custom searches have

240.

Id. at 537-38.

241. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
242. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973).
243. The judicial acceptance is evidenced by the Supreme Court's consistent
denial of certiorariin cases where the appellate courts have upheld the executive authority to issue warrantless foreign intelligence electronic surveillance.
Zweibon v. Mitchell, cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); United States v. Butenko,

cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974); United States v. Brown, cert. denied, 415 U.S.
960 (1974); United States v. Buck, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1979); United

States v. Clay, cert. denied, 394 U.S. 310 (1969).
244. See 124 CONG. REC. S6019 (daily ed. April 20, 1978) and 124
H9273 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1978).

CONG.
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been similarly sustained and held constitutional.24

5

Custom

searches are compatible with the fourth amendment, because of
the overriding governmental interest in the right of the sovereign
to protect itself and the history of acceptance of such searches. 4 6
The court in United States v. Ramsey stated:
Border searches, then, from before the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment, have been considered to be "reasonable" by the single
fact that the person or item in question had entered into our country from outside. There has never been any additional requirement
that the reasonableness 2of47 a border search depended upon the existence of probable cause.

A related fourth amendment issue precipitated by FISA is
whether the dual standard of review created by the definition of
"United States Person"24 8 as used in the categories of "foreign
power" and "agent of a foreign power" is permissible.249 Congress
recognized that the Act creates a lesser standard of review for the
invocation of electronic surveillance targeted at illegal aliens and
foreign visitors, and that eavesdropping upon such classes may be
authorized without a showing of criminal probable cause.2 50 Fur-

ther, minimization procedures are only applicable to information
concerning a United States person.251
It is clear that aliens, once within the United States, are afforded the full protection of the fourth amendment in the criminal justice system.2

52

Critics argue that since the fourth amend-

ment protects the "right of the people" 53 the standard mandated
by the amendment for citizens and resident aliens should apply to
illegal aliens, foreign visitors, foreign students, and alien foreign
embassy personnel. 254 Proponents of FISA argue that a finding of
245. Hearingson S. 1566, supra note 213, at 114-15 (Prepared Statement of
Hon. Griffin B. Bell, Attorney General of the United States).
246. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977).
247. Id. at 619.
248. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801 (i) (Supp. 1979).
249. Hearings of S. 1566, supra note 213, at 113-14 (Prepared Statement of

John H. F. Shattuck and Jerry J. Berman) and at 102-04 (Prepared Statement
of Prof. Christopher H. Pyle, Mount Holyoke College).
250. S. REP. No. 604-pt. 1, supra note 75, at 21-22.
251. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1801 (h) (Supp. 1979).
252. In re Weinstein, 271 F. 5, aff'd, 271 F. 673 (1920); Abel v. United States,
362 U.S. 217 (1960).

253. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
254. Hearings on S. 1566, supra note 213, at 113 (Prepared Statement of
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less than criminal probable cause will support an arrest for deportation of an alien as it will support a border search involving illegal aliens. 5 Critics argue that at best these cases may support
distinguishing illegal aliens from others properly in the country,
but such authority cannot support
a lesser standard for surveil25
lance of legal foreign visitors.

6

The congressional committee reports justified the distinction 25
in7
summary fashion by stating that Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong
supports the proposition that alienage differentiation is permissible "where there are compelling considerations of national security." 258 The Supreme Court did find that the federal government

may create classifications that distinguish aliens in an adverse
manner consistent with the fifth amendment due process clause
and its adjunct equal protection considerations if there is an overriding national interest justifying the discriminatory rule, even
though an identical classification made by a state would be prohibited.259 Yet, citation of this principle skirts the fourth amendment issue. Unlike Hampton,8 ° the basis of the equal protection
claim here is unequal statutory standards which are intended to
implement and deliniate fourth amendment rights. Thus, a separate fourth amendment problem is created. The approach of Congress and the administration is to look only at the equal protection aspect of the issue and reason that since there is a rational
basis for the classification and distinction between non-resident
aliens and United States persons the statute is in accord with the
entire Constitution.28

1

The problem with this reasoning is that

Congress has stated that FISA is a legislative interpretation of
the fourth amendment which dictates in the area of foreign intelligence surveillance, and the Supreme Court has ratified the notion that aliens are entitled to the full protection of the fourth
John H. F. Shattuck and Jerry J. Berman).
255. Id. at 113-14.
256. Id. at 114.
257. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
258. S. REP. No. 604-pt. 1, supra note 75, at 21; S.REP. No. 701, supra note
82, at 20.
259. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976).

260. The claim in Hampton was that a Civil Service Commission regulation
barring non-citizens from competing for Federal Civil jobs was violative of the
fifth amendment due process clause. Id.
261. Hearings of S. 1566, supra note 213, at 15 (Prepared Statement of Hon.
Griffin B. Bell).
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amendment.262 Yet the statute creates a lesser standard of fourth
amendment protection for non-United States persons.
Authority for this divergent set of fourth amendment standards
for United States persons and non-resident aliens might be found
in the cases involving border searches for aliens and deportation
interrogation and arrests of aliens. Under the Immigration and
Nationality Act officers of the Immigration Service are empowered to interrogate or arrest a person believed to be an illegal
alien on a finding of less than criminal probable cause. 263 Likewise, they may board and search any vehicle for illegal aliens
within a reasonable distance from a United States border without
having to acquire a warrant or without a showing of criminal
probable cause. 26' These statutory provisions are in accord with

the fourth amendment mandates even though they allow a lesser
standard of protection for aliens. 265 The justification for such pro-

visions lies in the overriding governmental interest of protecting
the national boundaries and the national security. 266 This reasoning could easily be extended to justify the FISA system which
provides a lesser standard of review prior to initiation of electronic surveillance directed at non-United States persons. A central legislative tenet of the Act is that the government has a legitimate and pressing need for 6foreign
intelligence information to
2 7
protect the national security.

The equal protection criticism of the statutory dual standards
is easily dealt with. The Supreme Court has consistently deferred
to federal statutes creating classifications aimed against aliens or
classes of aliens, so long as the statutory schemata has a rational
basis in a permissible governmental goal.26 8 The Court is unwilling to substitute its own judgment for that of either the federal
legislature or the Executive on decisions involving aliens. 2 9 The

Court stated in Mathews v. Diaz:
262. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
263. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (a) (1) and (2) (1976).
264. 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (a) (3) (1976).
265. Fernandez v. United States, 321 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1963); Tsimounis v.
J. W. Holland, 132 F. Supp. 754 (E.D. Pa. 1955), aff'd, 228 F.2d 907; see also
Almedia Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
266. Fernandez v. United States, 321 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1963).
267. S. REP. No. 604-pt. 1, supra note 75, at 9.
268. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426
U.S. 88 (1976).
269. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976).
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For reasons long recognized as valid, responsibility for regulating
the relationship between the United States and our alien visitors
has been committed to the political branches of the Federal Government. Since decisions in these matters may implicate our relations with foreign powers, and since a wide variety of classifications
must be defined in the light of changing political and economic circumstances, such decisions are frequently of a character more appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive than to the
2 70
Judiciary.
The collection of foreign intelligence is recognized as a permissible goal and legislative history provides support for the notion
that the statutory differentiation has a rational basis. 7 1
Another issue raised centers around the ability of the government, via the Attorney General, to usurp an aggrieved party's
right to be present at the hearing on his motion to supress FISA
information.2 72 If the Attorney General files an affidavit stating
"that an adversary hearing would harm the national security or
the foreign affairs of the United States" he can force an in camera and ex parte hearing on the critical motion of the defendant's
case.1 3 The basis of the objection to this procedure is that it denies the defendant his sixth amendment right to counsel and his
right to have an adversary hearing, an essential component of due
process in a criminal proceeding. 274 An ancillary argument is that
exclusion of the defendant from the pretrial suppression hearing
may violate the defendant's sixth amendment right of confrontation.2 7 5 Finally, it can be maintained that the proceeding violates
the defendant's right to have a public trial.276
One government argument in support of such an ex parte and
in camera hearing rests upon the premise that due process is a
flexible standard that mandates "procedural protections as the

270. Id.
271. Hearings on S. 1566, supra note 213, at 136 (Prepared Statement of
Steven B. Rosenfeld, Association of the Bar of the City of New York).
272. Hearings on S. 1566, supra note 213, at 15 (Prepared Statement of
Hon. Griffin B. Bell).
273. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1806 (f) (Supp. 1979).
274. See, Hearings on S. 1566, supra note 213, at 136 (Prepared Statement
of Steven B. Rosenfeld).
275. U.S. CONsT. Amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him ... and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
276. U.S. CONST. Amend. VI; In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
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In applying this premise, the

court must balance the interest of the defendant with compelling
governmental interests. Such governmental interests include protection of the national security and the need for secrecy in dealing with materials concerning foreign affairs which are either po278
tentially harmful to the country or potentially embarrassing.
Without an ex parte and in camera proceeding the only way to
effectively protect the government's interest is to not prosecute
criminal cases based upon sensitive FISA acquired information.
Likewise, the government would maintain that the nature of the
hearing and the material involved warrants suspension of the defendant's sixth amendment claims.
Another point supporting the government's position is that a
pretrial hearing to exclude evidence is not equivalent to a trial
and as such the rights on which the critics of FISA base their
objections to the ex parte and in camera proceeding are not applicable. The defendant's sixth amendment right to be confronted
with antagonistic witnesses has been held to be "basically a trial
right ....

It includes both the opportunity to cross-examine and

the occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor of the witness.

' 27 9

Since a defendant would be availed of the opportunity to

cross-examine the officers conducting the surveillance at trial, the
confrontation right is not violated by the FISA ex parte and in
camera pretrial hearing. Likewise the same argument can be
made to refute the defendant's claim that the hearing violated his
sixth amendment right to a public trial. 80
The due process challenge relates to the fact that neither the
defendant nor his attorney are allowed access to the hearing on
their motion to suppress the FISA acquired information. In trials
which involve possible admission of wiretap or bug attained information, the motion to suppress this information is often the criti-.
cal issue. 281 The Supreme Court has held that a fourth amend-

ment pretrial probable cause determination may be made without
the defendant's presence, without offending due process man277.

CongressionalResearch Service, Library of Congress, supra note 30, at

1406 (7th ed. 1972); Ex Parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 289 (1883).
278. Id. at 1145.
279. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968).
280. See, In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266-73 (1948).
281. See, Y. KAMISm, W.R. LAFAvE, AND J.H. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

12 (4th ed. 1974).
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dates. 82 The informal ex parte hearing was justified because a
probable cause determination would only result in the defendant
being bound over for trial and not a determination of guilt. The
determination does not require "the fine resolution of conflicting
evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance of the
evidence standard demands, and credibility determinations are
seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence supports a reasonable belief in guilt. 283 Further, the Court reasoned that the
pretrial hearing was not a critical stage (i.e. a "pretrial procedure
that would impair defense on the merits if the accused is required
to proceed without counsel").28 These authorities are arguably
inapposite when applied to a pretrial motion to supress FISA acquired information. The determination of the evidence's admissibility is likely the crucial issue in the case, which may require a
difficult resolution of convoluted and conflicting evidence and the
application of intricate and rapidly evolving principles of law.
Such a hearing is also arguably a "critical stage" of a criminal
prosecution of the sixth amendment right to counsel purpose and
as such it is subsumed within the defendant's right to an attorney
at the trial itself.28 5 The Supreme Court has similarly held that a
defendant is entitled to both an adversary hearing and an attorney to determine probable cause for parole288 and probation
violations.28
The government may counter that irrespective of either sixth
amendment challenges or the due process claim, the need for secrecy of the proceeding and the need to use FISA obtained information outweighs the defendant's interests. The government will
argue that neither the right to an attorney nor the right to confront witnesses is particularly important at a FISA evidence suppression hearing. Defendant by his attorney may submit briefs
detailing his objections to the admission of the eavesdropping
product. The Act also provides that if the court decides disclosure
of some of the information is necessary for a determination of the
legality of the search, it may disclose selected portions of the re282. Gernstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
283. Id. at 121.
284. Id. at 122-23.
285.

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).

286. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
287.

Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
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cord before the court.288 Yet, even with such safeguards, the defense is unable to respond to factual inconsistencies of the
presented evidence, unable to timely refute or attack any believed
falsity of evidence the government introduces, unable to confront
any witness the government puts on, and unable to oversee the
level of scrutiny the court gives their motion, in this most critical
stage of the defendant's case. Thus there are serious doubts as to
the constitutionality of 50 U.S.C.A. § 1806 (f) (Supp. 1979).
A final constitutional challenge to FISA is based upon the Supreme Court's decision in Berger v. New York.2 8 9 The Court over-

turned the eavesdropping pursuant to a New York statute, finding it "too broad in its sweep resulting in a trespassory intrusion
into a constitutionally protected area and.

. .

therefore violative

amendments." 290

The Court found
of the fourth and fourteenth
the statute reprehensible because it lacked a requirement for particularizing the specific crime suspected, the place to be searched,
or the things (i.e. specific conversations) to be seized.2 9 1 Secondly,

the Act authorized eavesdropping for a period of two months
upon a single application and an equally long extension upon a
mere showing that such an extension is in the public interest (i.e.
without showing new grounds for the surveillance).292 Third, the
statute failed to provide for termination of surveillance once the
sought after information was attained.2 93 Finally, the statute's
procedure allowed eavesdropping without requiring a showing of
exigent circumstances which would serve in place of the usual notice requirement of conventional search warrants. 94
The schemata of surveillance envisioned by FISA could similarly be attacked. Eavesdropping of non-United States persons
can occur without a showing of criminal probable cause, but the
statute does require specification of the conversation to be
seized, 29 5 the target of the surveillance, 2 6 and a showing that the
target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. 29 7 FISA

288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

50 U.S.C.A. § 1806
388 U.S. 41 (1967).
Id. at 44.
Id. at 55-56.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 59-60.
Id. at 60.
50 U.S.C.A. § 1804
50 U.S.C.A. § 1804
50 U.S.C.A. § 1804

(f) (Supp. 1979).

(a) (6) (Supp. 1979).
(a) (3) (Supp. 1979).
(a) (4) (A) (Supp. 1979).
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authorized surveillance for periods up to 90 days or one year, 2 9 s
but requires that extensions be based upon new findings capable
of supporting an original order.2 9 Additionally, under FISA the
surveillance normally terminates upon the acquisition of the desired information, but it is possible to circumvent this rule if the
application for surveillance states that the intelligence gathering
is to be ongoing and states facts which support the notion that
more information will be acquired.30 0 Finally, the statute assumes
that the exigency and priority of the need for foreign intelligence
surveillance compensates for any lack of notice.30 1 Thus, an argument that FISA creates too great a trespassory infringement upon
individuals can be made. Considering, however, the judicial history of yielding to executive and legislative discretion in this area,
it is unlikely such an argument would prevail.
VI. POSSIBLE FISA AMENDMENTS
After one year of the statute's operation, not one executive request for court authorized electronic surveillance under FISA had
been refused. This fact may either be attributable to the lack of
thorough judicial screening and the close working relationship of
the intelligence community and the seven district judges or it
might be attributable to more thorough executive screening of
possible FISA applications. This report does demonstrate, however, the need for further analysis and evaluation of the present
Act. If the prior hypothesis is correct, it points to a need to either
expand the number of judges who hear FISA petitions and/or to
create a panel of judges to hear the government's request for surveillance. This expansion will minimize the chances of undue government influence over the decision making process and will enhance scrutiny of the decision makers. Another method of
strengthening the screening of applications for surveillance might
be to require the same standard for initiation of surveillance
aimed at non-United States persons as is required for surveillance
involving United States persons.
An amendment which would clear up the most troublesome
constitutional issue would abandon the use of ex parte proceed298.
(Supp.
299.
300.
301.

50 U.S.C.A.
1979).
50 U.S.C.A.
50 U.S.C.A.
S. REP. No.

§ 1805 (d) (1) (Supp. 1979); 50 U.S.C.A. § 1802 (a) (1)
§ 1805 (d) (2) (Supp. 1979).
§ 1804 (a) (10) (Supp. 1979).
95-604-pt.1, supra note 75, at 59.
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ings for the review of the admissibility of FISA obtained evidence. The hearing still could be held in camera and by limiting
accessability to the defendant and one of his attorneys and by
ordering non-disclosure of any information brought out in the
hearing (especially an agent's identity), the threat of security
leaks may be attenuated. Furthermore, the government can always refuse to bring criminal charges if it feels that the risk of a
security leak is too great and it may revert to the remedy of deportation if the putative defendant is an alien.
The emergency warrantless surveillance provisions of 50
U.S.C.A. § 1805 (e) should be expanded to at least coincide with
the Title III provision.302 Requiring the government to bring an
application for electronic surveillance and to receive a judicial order pursuant to a hearing within twenty-four hours of initiation
of the emergency surveillance presents an undue hardship on the
government's ability to effectuate emergency surveillance.308
Forty-eight hours is a more reasonable time parameter in which
to file a petition for surveillance, especially in light of the fact
that only seven judges are empowered to hear such petitions.
FISA, via statutory proscription of warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance, clarified a confusing area of federal law. The
Act sets out specific procedures for the acquisition and regulation
of electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes by the
Executive. In this respect the Act well serves a meritorious purpose. The Act was also designed to balance the government's need
for procuring foreign intelligence information against the individual right to be free from invidous government intrusions upon his
privacy. The proper positioning of this legal fulcrum will require
careful evaluation of the current statutory schemata and of judicial and executive experience with the Act.
Kim L. Kelley

302. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (7) (1976).

303. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805 (e) (Supp. 1979).

